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TRANSFORMING HOW WE FIGHT
A Conceptual Approach
Major Christopher D. Kolenda, U.S. Army
Transformation has been defined correctly as a process rather than an endstate. Still, nagging questions linger. What is the purpose of transformation?
Toward what goal is military transforming headed? What do we want the future
military to do? What should it look like? How should it fight? The transforma-
tion, to be meaningful, must lead coherently from a present state toward an envi-
sioned future condition. Transformation, therefore, is most precisely a strategy
designed purposefully to achieve a cogent vision of the future. Absent this artic-
ulation of purpose, transformation risks moving in the wrong direction—or in
no direction at all. The key, to paraphrase Secretary of Defense Donald R.
Rumsfeld, is to have the right ladder standing against the right wall.
The struggle from which such a purpose may be de-
rived has been a powerful subtext of the transforma-
tion debate and has indeed informed arguments over
war planning against Iraq. In the meantime, the ser-
vices have pursued a disaggregated transformation—
each trying to improve what it does best. Problems
naturally arise with this approach, particularly in
areas such as joint interoperability and lift, by air and
sea—areas that are crucial for effectiveness at the joint
level but that might get low priority from an individ-
ual service perspective. Still, it is important not to
rush; making the intellectual effort to get the vision
right is crucial. Heading, however purposefully, in a
self-defeating direction would be disastrous.
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Up to this point, unfortunately, the debate about transformation and the fu-
ture of the military has remained largely rooted in technology. We need to up-
date our understanding of the nature of war and use it as a touchstone. The
future will belong not necessarily to the most technologically advanced combat-
ant but the one that understands the nature of war and can most effectively cope
with and exploit it. Such understanding is a necessary backdrop for the develop-
ment of vision and thereafter the intellectual, cultural, organizational, and tech-
nological components of transformation.
This article seeks to expand the debate to the necessary scope by proposing a
set of ideas to synthesize the enduring nature of war with contemporary techno-
logical realities, to bridge the gap between new technology and broad transfor-
mation. These ideas emerge from five critical postulates about the enduring
nature of war:
1. Information in war is “essentially dispersed.”
2. War is Chaotic.
3. Combatants in war are complex adaptive systems.
4. War is a nonlinear phenomenon.
5. War is the realm of uncertainty.
The insights from those postulates suggest that our armed forces will be most
effective if we master the following concepts:
1. Decentralization: create and exploit a knowledge advantage by empowerment at
the appropriate levels.
2. Complexity: gain a complexity advantage by maximizing the number of meaning-
ful interactions with which the enemy must cope simultaneously or nearly so.
3. Resilience: sustain balance and equilibrium in our own force while creating and
exploiting instability and disorder in the enemy.
4. Tempo: sustain an intensity of operations over time with which the enemy cannot cope.
The apparent lessons from conflicts over the past ten years point to an emerg-
ing paradigm about transformation, known as the “information technology
revolution in military affairs” (IT-RMA). Simply put, this increasingly popular
thesis suggests that information superiority plus precision munitions equals
victory.1 Decision makers will have a “near-omniscient view of the battlefield”
that will enable them to direct precision munitions onto targets with such rapid
and lethal effect that enemies will be reduced to “awe,” “shock,” or “paralysis,”
and in any case be “locked out” of the objectives they wish to pursue. Either way,
in this view, the enemy will have no choice but to give up.
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Embedded in the paradigm is the assumption that standoff precision muni-
tions delivered primarily from air or sea forces will have maximum effect on the
enemy with minimal risk to American lives and of collateral damage. A related
assumption is that an omniscient view of the battlefield will make centralization
of authority possible, indeed inevitable.2 Recent events in Kosovo and Afghani-
stan illustrate the new reality.3 Indeed the commander in chief of U.S. Central
Command was reportedly admonished for a DESERT STORM–like plan for in-
vading Iraq and was told to make it “look more like Afghanistan.”4
By continuing to focus almost exclusively on technology, the U.S. armed
forces risk developing strategies, force structures, and warfighting concepts that
are at odds with the nature of war.5 As Secretary Rumsfeld has argued, trans-
forming America’s military means changing “how we think about war,” encour-
aging a culture of creativity and risk taking.6 Transformation, therefore, has
important intellectual and cultural components, which must turn technological
advances into a more effective military.7 Consideration of these other compo-
nents of transformation, however, has too often devolved into little more than a
glib hype of exhausted adjectives. Failure to come to grips with cultural and in-
tellectual elements of transformation risks dooming the U.S. armed forces to
“expensive irrelevance” and inconsequential lethality.8
THE NATURE OF WAR
It is time to challenge the validity of the prevailing IT-RMA thesis by examining
some key aspects of the nature of war and offering alternative concepts that, if
pursued, would move the U.S. armed forces along the path of true, rather than
merely technological, transformation.
Information in War Is Essentially Dispersed
The Nobel Prize–winning economist Friedrich von Hayek (1900–92) argued
that information is “essentially dispersed” in the “extended market order.” Al-
though economic theory often translates uneasily from a business to a military
context, Hayek’s concept is useful for analyzing individual and collective human
behavior. The idea provides a conceptual foundation that can enable leaders to
liberate and direct the creative genius of their people and organizations.
Hayek viewed the market as an evolutionary process of discovery and adap-
tation in which individuals gather, process, and interpret information and
make choices to maximize their interests. What appears to be a chaotic market
reflects in fact a “spontaneous order” that is beyond any central designing in-
telligence.9 “Modern economics explains how such an extended order can
come into being,” suggests Hayek, “and how it constitutes an information-
gathering process, able to call up, and put to use, widely dispersed information
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that no central planning agency, let alone any individual, could know as a
whole, possess, or control.”10
Hayek argues that information, knowledge, and understanding are dispersed
in space and time. Human beings perceive, interpret, and understand informa-
tion and make decisions that reflect the lenses through which they view the
world. In the terms of modern psychology, the rationality of individuals is
bounded by such factors as experience, bias, education, and emotion.11 As a re-
sult, two people can look at the same picture and derive completely opposite
conclusions and accordingly take radically different courses of action to pursue
their interests.
The apparent dissonance can be explained, in part, by the difference between
“explicit” and “tacit” knowledge. Explicit knowledge is concrete information of
the sort that can be entered into databases and information systems; tacit knowl-
edge comprises the implicit information and processing capabilities that indi-
viduals possess as a result of their cognitive maps and perceptual lenses.12 Tacit
knowledge comes into existence and manifests itself in ways peculiar and spe-
cific to context. It is drawn upon only in particular circumstances. It shapes the
way we behold information, how we create knowledge and understanding, and
the degree to which we consider each item relevant and appropriate to a
situation.
The essentially dispersed nature of information suggests that the fusion of ex-
plicit knowledge onto a situational-awareness screen does not result automati-
cally in homogeneity of interpretation and decision. Different people, looking at
the same situation, perceive different crises and opportunities; they make differ-
ent assessments of risk; and they ultimately make different decisions about how
to maximize the effectiveness of themselves and their organizations. Shared sit-
uational awareness of physical relationships on the battlefield, therefore, does
not mean shared appreciation of how to act upon the information. The essen-
tially dispersed nature of information will remain salient in warfare. Our chal-
lenge is to “leverage” it.
War Is Chaotic
Chaos theory is a relatively new and complex branch of science and mathemat-
ics, the implications of which for human systems have only begun to be ex-
plored.13 Chaos contends that a system contains a certain complex order that is
determined by the nature and interrelationships of each element within it and
by each force that acts upon it. Elements within the system interact with one an-
other and with external inputs. The system also interacts with the “feedback”
from the first interactions, creating “system perturbations” (subsequent orders
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of effects) that shape the system and ultimately make it unpredictable. The result
is a peculiar order.
Chaos need not imply disorder. A Chaotic system can be stable or unstable. It
is stable if “its particular brand of irregularity” persists in the face of distur-
bances (inputs), or if it returns eventually to its particular brand of irregularity.
The inputs generate certain responses from the system that may be immediately
unpredictable but stable over time.14 A Chaotic system is unstable if inputs result
in a permanent change in the system’s regime of behavior or nature.15 Chaotic
systems are thus complex and deterministic.16 Because of the system’s complex-
ity, it is impossible to predict with absolute fidelity the impact of specific inputs
or interactions.
War is Chaotic.17 Clausewitz argued that “war is more a true chameleon that
slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case.” The dominant tendencies in
war—the famous “trinity” (passion, probability and chance, and reason) and
“triangle” (people, military, and government)—give each war in general, and its
combatants in particular, unique characteristics. Depending on context, these
tendencies, singly or in combination, can be resilient or fragile with respect to
particular inputs and interactions. “Our task therefore is to develop a theory
that maintains a balance between these three tendencies [of the trinity], like an
object suspended between three magnets.”18 Such insight is an implicit recogni-
tion of the Chaotic nature of war and of the combatants that participate in it.19
In a similar vein, Clausewitz described the criticality of “moral factors” as the
true measurement of an organization’s combat capability. He eschewed the at-
tempt to reduce war to fixed formulas, equations, and calculations of raw num-
bers.20 The continuing interaction of opposites with deterministic systems
makes war uncertain and unpredictable. Strength in moral factors gives resil-
ience to the organization, but such resilience is not itself a fixed quantity—
moral factors can grow or recede over time. A strong and confident army can be-
come demoralized; an unconfident and untested force can develop high morale.
The Chaotic nature of war endures. The challenge is to turn the fact to
advantage.
Combatants Are “Complex Adaptive Systems”
Human organizations are complex and adaptive.21 The individuals and teams
within the system react to inputs and adapt to changes. Sometimes those adap-
tations are consciously designed to maintain effectiveness in the face of a
threatening input or to capitalize upon an opportunity for growth or value
maximization. Others are subconscious or unconscious adaptations. Morale
and confidence, for instance, might decrease as efforts to cope with interactions
prove futile or, conversely, might increase as those efforts succeed.
1 0 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
5
Kolenda: Transforming How We Fight—A Conceptual Approach
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
A way to appreciate complexity, and its potential in war, is by contrasting it
with simple and compound systems. A simple system is linear: the force of a sin-
gle input will generate a proportional and predictable output. Decision making
in simplicity is fairly easy. The combatant must respond to only a single threat.
For instance, the presence of a bomber overhead will elicit a predictable “scatter”
response from a ground unit: to escape the effects of the bomber, the ground
unit disperses.
A compound system, on the other hand, is one in which two or more inputs
are present that force a combatant to make choices. Often the choice taken to
avoid one threat increases a combatant’s vulnerability to another. This time, the
ground unit is facing both a bomber and an opposing ground force. The best re-
action to the bomber is dispersion, but that choice will make the unit more vul-
nerable to the opposing ground force. Conversely, the best choice to oppose the
ground force is to concentrate the friendly ground forces; doing so, however,
makes it more vulnerable to the bomber. The commander is on the horns of a di-
lemma. The combination of threats in a specific battle or context increases the
challenge for the enemy. Compound systems account for interaction at the
friendly-versus-enemy level.
A complex system is one in which interactions take place on multiple levels.
Combatants interact with more than just the enemy. In war, commanders inter-
act within themselves—their own emotions, goals, biases, and experiences—
and with their staffs as they attempt to cope with war’s complexity while simul-
taneously trying to accomplish the war’s purpose. Commanders and organiza-
tions also interact with friendly forces. At the strategic level, this can be
interaction with the people and the government. At the operational and tactical
levels, this can mean interaction with adjacent forces or other instruments of na-
tional power. The activities of friendly forces shape the context in which our
own operations take place. In a similar vein, there is interaction with the external
environment. Examples of external forces are, among others, political directives,
coalitions, the physical environment, and third-party inputs to the system. The
complexity of war, therefore, increases with the number of critical interactions
and adaptations affecting the components of the Clausewitzian trinity and
triangle.
Warfare is not a single, isolated act. Interactions take place simultaneously on
various levels. As long as the system—the individual, the organization, the
country—remains resilient, it will attempt to adapt effectively to crises and op-
portunities. As the system becomes more fragile, its ability to sustain effective-
ness erodes. Adaptations aimed at other purposes (such as individual survival)
can rise to the fore, atomizing and unraveling the fabric of the combatant.
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Evolutionary biology theory lends insight into the unpredictability of com-
plex interaction within Chaotic systems. Although it is possible in hindsight to
trace backward the development of a species, predicting its evolution in advance
is not possible.22 Too many singular factors intervene to determine the outcome
ahead of time—that is, as in Chaotic systems, the result is deterministic but not
predictable.23 The outcomes of individual interactions, therefore, alter the gen-
eral situation and affect the choices of others. They shape the nature of future in-
teractions and thus exert successive effects.24
When applied to war, the concept of adaptive complexity suggests that the
number of possible outcomes increases unpredictably with the number of
meaningful inputs.25 As each side adapts to those inputs, interactions can gener-
ate effects and responses that defy prediction and expectation.26 Looking back-
ward from the outcome, one can readily perceive a logical, understandable
unfolding of interactions.27 From the perspective of the observer in the midst of
the process in time and space, however, the result was only one of myriad
possibilities.
War Is a “Nonlinear Phenomenon”
The Chaotic nature and adaptive complexity of war render it a nonlinear phe-
nomenon.28 A linear outcome is one in which the strength of the input yields an
output of proportional strength; a nonlinear outcome is one that is not directly
proportional to the input.29 Nonlinear systems, as historian Alan Beyerchen ex-
plains, “are those that disobey proportionality or additivity. They may exhibit
erratic behavior through disproportionately large or disproportionately small
outputs, or they may involve ‘synergistic’ interactions in which the whole is not
equal to the sum of its parts.”30 In a nutshell, a nonlinear outcome is one that de-
fies the logic and science of linearity.
Nonlinear systems are living, animate, and adaptive. They can change over
time and by interaction with their contexts.31 As Chaos and complexity theories
suggest, the alterations that result can move the system into a qualitatively dif-
ferent nature or regime of behavior. Nonlinearity helps to explain why even
subtle inputs to the system sometimes yield inordinately large outputs and, con-
versely, why large inputs may have only minor effects. Small changes to initial
conditions in a fragile system can lead to outcomes that defy proportionality,
while large inputs to a resilient system might simply be absorbed. A given input
can yield different outcomes at different times, because the nature of the system
at any moment is dependent upon context.32 As Beyerchen summarizes, “The
heart of the matter is that the system’s variables cannot be effectively isolated
from each other or from their context; linearization is not possible, because dy-
namic interaction is one of the system’s defining characteristics.”33
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To recognize war as a nonlinear phenomenon is to acknowledge that no sin-
gle formula, equation, methodology, or capability can predict outcomes or guar-
antee victory. Inputs can cause effects that are disproportionately large or small;
they can cause “system perturbations” and unintended consequences, responses
to which can lead in turn to successive effects that change the situation funda-
mentally but could scarcely have been anticipated.34 Effective adaptation to the
unpredictability of warfare remains a fundamental challenge.
War Is the “Realm of Uncertainty”
Warfare, then, is by nature uncertain.35 Prevailing concepts of uncertainty, how-
ever, are inadequate. Uncertainty is commonly understood as a matter of infor-
mation.36 If that is the case, the argument that information superiority, or
“dominant battlespace knowledge,” can “lift the fog of war” is plausible.37 Uncer-
tainty, however, is not reducible to information. To be sure, simple uncertainties,
unknown but attainable pieces of information, can be reduced radically by tech-
nology. But simple uncertainties merely scratch the surface of the issue.
An uncertainty not necessarily reducible to existing information concerns
the future. According to one influential study, such situations of future uncer-
tainty can be grouped into four categories. In the first, a “clear enough future,”
forecast precisely enough for strategic development, is apparent—though abso-
lute certainty is impossible, the future seems to point inexorably in a single stra-
tegic direction. In other cases, “alternate futures,” a few discrete outcomes are
plausible. In a third category the actual outcome can lie anywhere along a broad
(but bounded) continuum: a “range of futures” in which no discrete outcomes
are obvious. True “ambiguity” is the last category. In this case there is no basis
upon which to forecast the future.38
Aside from those that result from gaps in information and those relating to
the future, there are several other types of uncertainty that are crucial to an un-
derstanding of war.39 Intrinsic uncertainty results from “bounded rationality”—
the existence of a gulf between perception and reality. Cognitive biases, emo-
tions, assumptions, experiences, education, and heuristics all shape the meaning
people elicit from information. This type of uncertainty accounts for the phe-
nomenon of two people seeing the same things and deriving different conclu-
sions. Particularly in complex, unique, and ambiguous environments, the
decisions and actions arising from bounded rationality can be highly unpredict-
able. Frictional uncertainty deals with the inability to predict precisely how the
“friction of war” will manifest itself. Equipment failures and performance
anomalies form a part, but more importantly, so do poor communication, fear,
danger, exhaustion, disobedience, initiative, will, inertia, and other human
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factors. These frictions can affect individuals and organizations in ways that
defy prediction and expectation.
Dynamic uncertainty is the most problematic, because it results from interac-
tion. The concepts of Chaos, adaptive complexity, and nonlinearity underscore
the inherent unpredictability in war that results when forces interact. An input
that generates a certain response from one system will likely elicit a much differ-
ent one from another. Destroying a communications network, for instance,
might make one combatant unwilling to continue the war; it might merely stim-
ulate another combatant to increase the intensity of resistance. Such outcomes
result from complex interactions that defy precise modeling and forecasting.40
Intrinsic, frictional, and future uncertainties exacerbate the problem.
Coping with uncertainty has traditionally meant collecting more informa-
tion. In this approach, the decision maker must have a sense of what is know-
able and accessible and what is not. He or she must also understand the cost of
additional information and determine whether the effort is worthwhile. The
decision maker uses analyses refined on the basis of the new information to de-
velop strategies to shape or adapt to developments and to determine the right
“portfolio of actions” in response to them.41 Uncertainty has been something
to be overcome (by information) or something to “bind” (by anticipating the
future).
The existence of frictional, intrinsic, and dynamic uncertainties suggests that
the old paradigm is incomplete. Chaos, adaptive complexity, and nonlinearity
suggest that instability and fragility in the system can lead to highly contingent,
disproportionate, and dysfunctional outcomes. Coping in advance with uncer-
tainty requires creating the conditions necessary for resilience. Second, uncer-
tainty demands versatility and flexibility if crises and opportunities are to be
responded to in a manner that derives maximum advantage. Last, this broader
concept demands an approach to war that focuses on the creation and exploita-
tion of uncertainty in the enemy.
TRANSFORMING HOW WE FIGHT
A combatant who understands the nature of war and can not only cope with
but exploit it will have a decided advantage. This perspective can open new and
more appropriate pathways toward real transformation. It also can serve as a
reference point from which to evaluate the IT-RMA thesis and to suggest alter-
natives to a myopic focus on technology. Our ability to do so will in many ways
determine the effectiveness of our armed forces in both the present and the
future; it depends, in turn, on our ability to master four basic conceptual
approaches.
1 0 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
9
Kolenda: Transforming How We Fight—A Conceptual Approach
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
Decentralization
A knowledge advantage can be exploited by empowering people at the lowest
possible level. The notion that information is essentially dispersed in the ex-
tended order of the battlefield, coupled with the fact that shared information
does not necessarily imply a shared appreciation as to how to respond to it, leads
to fundamental questions regarding how organizations should be commanded
and controlled. One part of the issue concerns whether a centralized or decen-
tralized approach is more effective.42
The increasing transparency of the battlefield makes the impulse for central-
ization more difficult to control. The argument is that very senior commanders
now have “dominant battlespace knowledge”; that they know everything neces-
sary to make rapid and sound decisions. The interconnectedness of the organi-
zation, in this view, enables the commander to transmit those decisions
instantaneously to subordinates and monitor precisely how those orders are im-
plemented. The core assumptions of this argument are that shared informa-
tion leads to shared understanding, that decisions are made most effectively at
higher echelons of organization, that organizations consist of “decision entities”
controlling “actor entities”—and that networks permit fewer of the former to
control more of the latter.
Such centralization of authority, however, would suboptimize the perfor-
mance of the military and the people who constitute it, because, as studies in the
behavioral sciences have shown, bounded rationality is intrinsic to human na-
ture. In a crisis, as we have seen, one person might respond conservatively while
another person recognizes a fleeting opportunity worth significant risk.43 Cen-
tralizing authority has the unfortunate consequence of limiting battlefield un-
derstanding to a single “decision entity.” That might seem safe, in that a senior
commander is presumably less likely, by virtue of experience and education, to
make a poor decision than a more junior commander. However, the creative ten-
sion that results from competing perspectives is lost.44 Moreover, removing from
junior leaders the sense of responsibility, “ownership,” and empowerment de-
creases motivation, retards creative thinking and problem solving, and results
generally in less effective execution. The likelihood that decisions will not be ex-
ecuted in the manner intended increases with psychological distance between
decision maker and actor.45
Empowerment of professionals at the lowest possible levels is the most effec-
tive guarantor of excellence. Technology should unleash the power of people
rather than handcuff it. Liberating the creative genius of people can create a cer-
tain complex order in an operation that no central authority could conceive or
direct and that no enemy could fully comprehend or counter. In any case, the
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idea that information is essentially dispersed argues for a similar decentraliza-
tion of authority.46
Decentralization, it is important to note, has its limits. Empowering un-
trained subordinates merely leads to poor decisions made more quickly; dissem-
ination of authority in the absence of direction or guidance can produce
disjointed activity that fails to accomplish the purpose of the operation, even
impedes it. Leaders must define the creative space in which their subordinates
are free to act. Statements of commander’s intent, mission, boundaries, rules of
engagement, and main effort are traditional methods of bounding that space
and providing reference points. A new approach to the same problem is “effects
basing”—explaining the effects a commander wants to achieve and how ground,
sea, and space forces and other elements of national power interrelate, while al-
lowing subordinate commanders to determine precisely how to achieve those ef-
fects. Leaders can also utilize “permissive” rules of engagement, instructions,
and control measures designed to accelerate the decision-action cycle.47
To be sure, the senior leader must have confidence that a subordinate will
make sound decisions. Training, education, and mutual understanding gained
through acquaintanceships are natural foundations of mutual trust. Ad hoc or-
ganizations, accordingly, have difficulty with decentralization. We need to de-
velop understanding and trust in the necessary depth at the operational level in
peacetime so that it can be drawn upon in war. Standing joint task force staffs
that train and communicate routinely with the tactical commanders and orga-
nizations they are likely to employ in action might prove important. We should
also examine institutional impediments that create impulses toward micro-
management: how long officers remain in command positions, the education
and training they receive, and how often command teams and staff teams oper-
ate together.
Information in the hands of people who cannot act on it is worth little; in the
hands of those who can, it creates complex synergies of unimaginable power. We
can guarantee suboptimal performance by centralizing authority while placing
relatively powerless people in harm’s way, or we can create a culture that truly
transforms how we operate. Technology is neutral in this regard. A “culture of
confidence” requires self-discipline and a relentless passion for excellence. Such
a culture likewise relies upon junior professionals to be worthy of trust—an is-
sue, to be sure, that deserves more attention.48 The ability of commanders to ed-
ucate and train professional subordinates, give them the authority they need,
promote innovative thinking and responsible risk taking, and resist the urge to
micromanage is crucial to warfighting effectiveness. Finally, creating the right
culture requires institutions and systems that enhance rather than impede de-
centralization. Technology gives us tools to fight with. The degree to which we
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can liberate and focus the creative genius of educated and trained professionals
will determine how well we fight.
Complexity
A complexity advantage can be achieved by maximizing the number of mean-
ingful interactions with which the enemy must cope simultaneously or nearly
so. Complexity increases further if interactions occur at multiple levels. It also
rises when response to one interaction creates “system perturbations” to which a
combatant must respond as well. The most effective way to gain the complexity
advantage is by combining the concept of “effects-based operations” with joint
capabilities.49
The notion that standoff precision munitions alone can generate the right ef-
fects and produce the psychological collapse of the enemy is at odds with the
idea of adaptive complexity. A thinking enemy who is determined to win will
find ways to mitigate the effects of standoff precision munitions.50 Despite their
destructive power, such weapons, employed in isolation, have limited psycho-
logical impact. Their shock value erodes rapidly, and their effects can be coun-
tered with relatively few adverse consequences.51
“Complex” should not be confused with “complicated”; neither should “sim-
ple” be conflated with “simplistic.” Simple actions that pose diverse threats,
when integrated properly, produce complexity for the enemy. At the tactical
level, tasks relatively simple to understand and implement—defend from a battle
position; emplace obstacles; employ indirect fires, close air support, and rotary-
wing aviation; and counterattack by fire—can create, when integrated into a de-
fensive operation, a very complex challenge for the enemy. Each threat by itself
may be easy to deal with; when they are integrated, attempts to evade or defeat
one will result in increased vulnerability to others. Threats from multiple direc-
tions and in multiple dimensions—sea, air, ground, and space—exacerbate the
complexity.
The principle applies similarly at the operational and strategic levels. Balanced,
synergistic employment of complementary capabilities to achieve effects along
“multiple lines of operation” integrates simple individual tasks into complexity
for the enemy.52 The simultaneous, integrated employment of precision-strike
and ground maneuver forces on enemy formations and critical vulnerabilities,
coupled with operational fires on second-echelon or reserve forces; special oper-
ations forces operations on strategic targets; strikes against the enemy’s commu-
nications, economy, and infrastructure; public and private diplomacy aimed at
coalition partners and third parties; and the use of economic instruments of
power are ways to generate complexity at the operational and strategic levels of
war. The increased number of options available to a balanced force to employ all
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of its elements of power in an integrated manner will complicate further the
range of problems with which the enemy must cope.53
In addition, bringing to bear a whole array of capabilities can cause “virtual
attrition”—the diversion of assets to deal with anticipated threats—which can
make our operations even more effective at the points of focus. Faced with such
complexity, the enemy becomes more likely to make critical, even self-defeating
errors. By making our actions unpredictable enough, we may create such uncer-
tainty for the enemy as to induce cognitive or psychological collapse. A complex
operation is far more likely to do so than a simplistic assault by a single
capability.
Resilience
Related to complexity is the concept of resilience, by which balance and equilib-
rium can be sustained in our own force while instability and disorder are created
and exploited in the enemy. Chaotic, complex adaptive systems such as combat-
ants at war range in robustness from resilient to fragile. Resilient systems can ab-
sorb inputs and yet sustain, or quickly return to, their “normal” regimes of
behavior, while fragile systems become disordered and incoherent.54 Both are in-
herently nonlinear. We see unpredictable outcomes in war routinely—the small
resilient unit withstands and rebuffs an attack despite being vastly outnum-
bered; another defending unit collapses entirely in the face of an attack by a nu-
merically weaker foe.55 We cannot predict with certainty such disproportionate
outcomes, but we can approach the Chaotic, complex, and nonlinear natures of
war from the perspectives of resilience and fragility in order to tilt the outcomes
of interaction in our favor.
Clausewitz described the nature of combatant states in terms of the “trinity”
and “triangle,” and of the strength of armed forces with respect to physical size,
moral factors, and the relative genius of their commanders. Although such a
framework is not perfect, it does capture significant “points of attraction” that
together influence the degree of resilience in the system.56 Combatants must cul-
tivate and sustain resilience by attending to these points of attraction at the stra-
tegic, operational, and tactical levels. It will be critically important to the process
of military transformation to develop the factors that influence morale, cohe-
sion, and leadership with the same amount of energy and enthusiasm now de-
voted to technology.
The opposite side of the coin naturally concerns the enemy’s degree of resil-
ience; operations should create and exploit fragility in the enemy in order to in-
duce nonlinear outcomes in our favor. As we have seen, however, a note of
caution is in order—we must not assume that any single weapon can bring
about the inevitable collapse of the enemy. Some enemies are indeed fragile
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enough to be defeated by standoff precision munitions alone, as believed by
some theorists. A more resilient enemy, however, will sustain the will to fight.
Rather than relying on problematic assumptions of inevitable collapse after
precision-guided missile (PGM) attacks, the U.S. military needs to focus instead
on creating the conditions in which the will to fight becomes increasingly diffi-
cult to sustain. By maximizing the level of complexity and exploiting fragility we
inflict the greatest possible pressure on the enemy’s will. The complexity gener-
ated by a properly employed, balanced, joint force will create the conditions nec-
essary for successful military operations whether the enemy’s will is strong or
weak. Understanding the nature of combatants and the relationships between
complexity and resilience is the basis of a sounder approach to warfighting.
Tempo
The concept of tempo—sustaining an intensity of operations with which the en-
emy cannot cope—integrates decentralization, complexity, and resilience. A
combatant’s will to resist is rarely broken by single spikes in the intensity of op-
erations; in the respites that follow during periods of transition, the enemy re-
covers, adapts, and resumes the fight.57 Instead, intense, complex interactions
need to be created and maintained over an extended period of time. Operations
that integrate effects, generating the most possible at each level of war, and do so
unrelentingly have the most potential to break the enemy’s will.
Organizations require considerable structural resilience and balance to
mount such operations at high sustained tempo without exceeding the limits of
their own capability or endurance.58 To dominate transitions we need to elimi-
nate the operational pauses that result from too little numerical strength to sus-
tain tempo or from improperly assembled forces that cannot overcome the
effects of terrain and weather.
Studies of combat psychiatry and nonlinear dynamics indicate that dispro-
portionate negative outcomes—cognitive or psychological collapse—occur
when systems, whether organizations or individual humans, do not have time to
recover their equilibrium.59 The ability, then, to sustain constant pressure
against the enemy’s points of leverage becomes crucial—to deny the enemy peri-
ods of rest in our transitions between offense and defense or between our suc-
cessive offensive or defensive operations. Constant pressure requires not only a
balanced force but one able to win the initial fight and then to commit fresh
units to maintain pressure while the previously engaged units recover.60 The na-
ture of the enemy determines whether and when cognitive or psychological col-
lapse will be achieved, but we can stretch his moral factors to the limit by
“nesting” significant effects at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels and
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by dominating transitions so as to deny the enemy any chance to recover
equilibrium.
RELEASING CREATIVE GENIUS
Technological improvement is important but, pursued in isolation, will lead us
only so far.61 We must simultaneously examine desired operational capabilities
and cultural and intellectual concepts that express how we want to fight. The
synergistic interaction of analysis and synthesis among broad categories leads to
innovation that is greater than any single approach can contribute on its own.
We will fail if we focus exclusively on technology.
One of the problems with technological evolution and revolutions in military
affairs is that the first organizations to experience such changes do not necessar-
ily come to grips with them most effectively.62 Technological and conceptual
change must be integrated in a manner consistent with the enduring nature of
war.
Information technology, of course, can radically improve the speed at which
orders are transmitted; create forums for dialogue between commanders strug-
gling to interpret reality on the basis of what they see on the ground and on their
computer screens; enable commanders to apply combat power quickly to exploit
fleeting opportunities; and permit an order-of-magnitude increase in the tempo
of operations. A technology-based common operating picture can help com-
manders unleash the creative energies of their subordinates while ensuring that
their actions and decisions remain within the framework of their own intent.63
However, the true magic of high-performing organizations is that professionals,
given the authority and autonomy they need within the parameters of their se-
niors’ vision, creatively employ their interdependent efforts in a manner that
leads to the success of the whole organization. Information technology should,
in the hands of mature and thoughtful leaders, result in empowerment and ini-
tiative rather than rigidity and overmanagement.64
True transformation will be measured not by the speed of microchips but by
the effectiveness of soldiers, leaders, and organizations in the next war. We need
to stimulate and release the creative genius of our people. We must develop lead-
ers who possess intellectual courage, who understand the theory and history—
the art and science—of their profession, who can combine education and expe-
rience into wisdom, and who can cope with the enduring nature of war and turn
it to their advantage. We need to develop resilient organizations that are cohe-
sive, trained, confident, and ready to fight and win. Implementing warfighting
concepts and doctrines that promote resilience and agility while generating
higher complexity and operational tempo than the enemy can handle will en-
sure dominance even if an enemy can match or mitigate our technological
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advantages. A balanced, truly joint force armed with effective leaders, versatile
commands, and sound warfighting concepts and doctrines will be the founda-
tion of a truly dominant military in the twenty-first century.
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